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This study applies Enders and Siklos’ (2001) procedure to test for the long-run asymmetric co-integrating 
relationship and short-run dynamic Granger causality between Pakistani lending and deposit rates set by public, 
private, foreign, specialized, and all banks combined over the period January 2004 to December 2013. Terrorist 
activities on the money market plays negative role. The empirical results suggest a long-run asymmetric co-
integration relationship between the rates. The Granger causality tests suggest bidirectional and asymmetric 
causality between lending and deposit rates set by Pakistani public and private banks, while the lending rates set 
by the country’s foreign, specialized and all banks combined are exogenous from their deposit rates.  The 
unusually fast and overshot adjustments of the lending rates in response to increases in the intermediation 
premium of public banks are interpreted as graft maximization.  The asymmetric and different nature of the 
Granger causalities exhibited by banks with different ownership structures should be of special interest for the 
Central Bank in formulating and implementing its countercyclical monetary policy and for corporations in 
determining their capital structures. 
 
Key Words: Asymmetry, co-integration, lending rate, deposit rate, intermediation premium, TAR Model, 
Pakistan. 
 
JEL Classification: E58, G21 
 
I.  INTRODUCTION  
Pakistani is a country where economic indiscipline is prevailing. Terrorist activities on the money 
market plays negative role. The spread between the lending rate banks charge borrowers for consumer loans and 
the deposit rate they pay savers is defined-henceforth as “intermediation premium”. This premium not only 
provides interest income to financial intermediaries, but it also influences a country’s level of savings, investment, 
economic development and social progress. This intermediation premium also reveals how commercial banks 
respond to counter cyclical monetary policy, economic shocks and hence the effectiveness of the central bank’s 
monetary policymaking. Consequently, analysis of this intermediation premium illuminates and provides insight 
into banking behavior. Moreover, modern economic theory articulates that nominal interest rates can be 
decomposed to the real rate premium, and the inflation expectation premium; hence, the difference between these 
two nominal rates is the real spread. In this context, the intermediation premium may be considered as a real 
measure in nature.  
Accordingly, this paper examines the behaviors of Pakistani banks of different types of ownerships, i.e., 
public, private, foreign, special, and all banks, with a focus on their consumer lending deposit rate setting and the 
behaviors of their intermediation premium, and in turn ,the dynamic inter relationship of the elements that 
determine them. The empirical finding should be of special interest to policy makers as well as all other economic 
agents in the economy. The contribution of this investigation to the literature is the finding that the interest rate 
setting behaviors of banks with different ownership structures in a country is different from that of all banks 
combined. 
From the theoretical perspective of interest rate settings, banks in a free market economy would 
incorporate all elements of risk and set a risk-free equilibrium spread between threats paid savers and the rates 
charged consumer borrowers, i.e., the intermediation premium. If banks set a premium either too high or too low, 
market forces would force an adjustment back to some equilibrium spread. Monopolistic or oligopolistic 
concentration, or specific conditions in which the bank operates, thwart the operation of such free market forces 
and lead to wider , asymmetric spreads and larger intermediation premium. Asymmetries in any of the four types 
of ownership banks illustrate this process as economic or specific conditions that separately influence the rate 
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charged consumer borrowers and the rate paid savers, resulting in a  premium larger than a free market determined 
spread maintained by other types of Pakistani banks. 
As stated in the Pakistani Central Bank policy statement “State Bank of Pakistan decides about its policy 
rate in the light of inflation prospects in a short to medium horizon along with likely developments and outcome 
in major macroeconomic variables. Other market interest rates follow the suit and adjust accordingly. The most 
immediate impact is on the short term interbank rate while the other major market rates include Karachi 
interbank offer rate, banks’ deposit and lending rates, government securities auction rate etc...” The focus of 
this paper explores that theoretic proposition and more specifically probes the question: do asymmetries exist in 
loan/deposit rate spreads in banks of any of the aforementioned types, and if such asymmetries are present, how do 
lending rates and deposit rates set by these banks respond to these asymmetries? Are the responses independent or 
dynamically interrelated? The remainder of this study is organized as follows: the following section briefly 
reviews the literature on asymmetries in lending-deposit rate setting behavior by commercial banks ;the next 
section presents the methodology and models to be used in the investigation ;the section that follows describes the 
data and the descriptive statistics  used in the analysis ;the next section reports the empirical results ;the 
concluding section provides observations and remarks. 
II.  REVIEW OF LITERATURE  
2.1 Asymmetric Adjustment 
The rational effort theoretically hypothesizing asymmetric responses to the national countercyclical 
monetary policy can be attributed to the documented asymmetric rate-setting behavior of the commercial banks 
in the context to rates of return on financial market instruments. Dueker(2000) and Tkacz(2001) have reported 
asymmetries in the U.S. prime lending rate in the past. Thompson(2006) found asymmetries in the U.S. prime 
lending-deposit rate spread. Sarno and Thornton(2003)found asymmetries in U.S. Treasury securities in their 
studies. Frost and Bowden (1999)and Scholnick(1999)reported asymmetries in mortgage rates in New Zealand 
and Canada. Hofmann andMizen(2004)indicated asymmetric behavior of retail rates in the United Kingdom. 
Hannan and Berger (1991),and Neumark and Sharpe(1992))examined various deposit rates for the same 
behavior. Several studies have found asymmetric co- integration between bank lending   and  deposit   rates.  For 
instance, Nguyen et al.(2008)documented similar asymmetries in Mexican lending and deposit rates .Nguyen 
and Islam(2010)reported asymmetries in the Thai bank lending and deposit rates. Nguyen et al.(2013) found 
asymmetries in the Colombian lending deposit rates. Chang and 
Su(2010)reportednonlinearcointegrationbetweenthelendingandthedepositrateinten Eastern European countries. 
Lately ,Haug and Basher (2011) found non linear cointegration in the purchasing powerparity relationships for 
Canada, Japan, Switzerland, theUK, Belgium, France, Germany, Ital yand the Netherlands. For Bangladesh 
economy the estimation results reveal the unidirectional Granger causality from the real GDP growth rate to the 
countercyclical monetary policy, i.e., the real GDP growth rate is weakly exogenous from the Bangladeshi 
countercyclical monetary policy actions (Nguyen, Islam and Ali,2012). 
Three main approaches help explain the rate-setting behavior of the banking sector: the bank 
concentration hypothesis, the consumer characteristic hypothesis, and the consumer reaction hypothesis. The 
bank concentration hypothesis posits that oligopolistic banks raise lending rates quickly in reaction to favorable 
market forces but are much slower in raising deposit rates. The reverse is the case in declining markets as they 
react quickly to adjust downward the rates paid depositors and slower to reduce the rates charged borrowers 
(Neumark and Sharpe, 1992;Hannan and Berger, 1991).The consumer characteristic and consumer reaction 
hypotheses posit that a greater proportion of unsophisticated consumers ,coupled with higher search and 
switching costs, provides bankers with heightened opportunities to adjust rates and widen the spread ,thereby 
increasing the banks’ advantage and producing incrementalprofits(CalemandMester, 1995; Hutchison,1995; 
Rosen,2002). 
Interestingly, the asymmetric adjustment in lending rates may be influenced by a further asymmetry. 
Banks may be reluctant to raise rates to the full extent allowed by a rising market because to do so could lead to an 
adverse selection pool of predominantly higher risk loans. Restraint in maximizing lending rates encourages abroad 
base  of loans with an inherent lower detrimental risk pool(StiglitzandWeiss,1981). 
 
2.2 Pakistani Banking Industry 
 
As to the banking industry, IMF Country Report No. 05/157 (2005) posited that Structure of the 
Pakistani banking sector has substantially changed in the last decade, particularly following the privatization of 
the state-owned banks. In1990, the banking system was dominated by five commercial banks which were all 
state-owned. The 1990 amendments to the Banking Companies Ordinance launched the process of financial 
sector reforms by allowing privatization of the state-owned banks. During the first round of reform, two of the 
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state-owned banks, Muslim Commercial Bank and Allied Bank, were privatized between 1991 and 1993. The 
reforms process was subsequently delayed for several years and resumed significantly only in the early 2000s.  
As articulated by Burki and Ahmad (2011), Pakistan’s banking sector has undergone structural changes 
as part of the phased reforms in the financial sector that were initiated in 1990/91. These reforms paid attention 
to, among other things, prudential regulations that authorized:  (i) the opening of several new private and foreign 
banks, (ii) the restructuring and downsizing of state-owned banks before being privatized, and (ii) reforms 
relating to mergers and acquisitions (M&A) that helped consolidate private and foreign banks. These reforms led 
to a dramatic decrease in the asset share of state-owned banks, from 93 percent in 1990 to only 22 percent in 
2004. In the same period, the share of private banks increased from 0 to 67.5 percent, and that of foreign banks 
increased from 6.7 to 10.4 percent (State Bank of Pakistan, 2004). The reforms also allowed foreign banks to 
compete freely with domestic banks. 
However, formulating and implementing monetary policy in Pakistan is very challenging due to the 
weaknesses of the StateBankofPakistana n d  t h e  c o m m e r c i a l  b a n k  s y s t e m  w h i c h  h a v e  b e e n  
a r t i c u l a t e d  b y  P a k i s t a n i  C e n t r a l  B a n k s  a n d  r e p o r t e d  b y  International Monetary Fund’s annual 
country reports. Internally, State Bank of Pakistan’s November 2013 Monetary Policy Statement Government 
borrowing from the banking system has remained the key driver of monetary expansion during FY13. The same 
trend continues in FY14, so far. Also, Monetary Policy Statement, September 2013 State Bank of Pakistan  
stated in terms of controlling growth in money supply, however, SBP’s efforts of curtailing liquidity injections 
did not experience much success. It is because these were offset by an increase in direct fiscal borrowings from 
the SBP. Specifically, from the outstanding level of Rs691 billion at end-January 2013, the liquidity injections 
by the SBP through OMOs declined to Rs208billion by end-June 2013. During the same period, the fiscal 
authority borrowed Rs687 billion from SBP on flow basis. The trend has continued in FY14 so far and in fact 
there is Rs296 billion outstanding in terms of liquidity mop-up as of 13th September, 2013. Similarly, the fiscal 
authority has borrowed another Rs547 billion during 1st July – 30th August, FY14.  
State Bank of Pakistan’s January 2014 Monetary Policy Statement articulated that as a result of 
excessive fiscal borrowings from the banking system and a weak external position, net domestic assets to net 
foreign assets  ratio of banking system has increased sharply to 177 as on 27th December 2013 from 32 at end 
June 2013. This deterioration clearly highlights the risk of substitution of domestic assets with foreign assets, 
which may have adverse implications for exchange rate as well as inflation outlook.  
Externally, IMFCountry Report No. 12/35Pakistan 2011 Article IV Consultation and Proposal for Post-
Program Monitoring reported that strengthening central bankautonomy and increasing monetary policy 
effectiveness should aid in achieving sustained disinflation. The current legal structure, especially the absence of 
a strong framework for direct government financing, significantly impairs central bank independence. The legal 
reform sto increase SBP independence are critical, but the draft amendments currently being discussed in 
parliament do not meet this objective in that they do not ensure the operational independence of the SBP. In 
addition, increasing financial deepening by fostering competition in the banking sector and improving the 
functioning of financial markets are important for strengthening monetary policy effectiveness 
In its 2013 Article IV Consultation and Proposal for an Extended Arrangement under the Extended 
Fund Facility, the IMF Country Report No.13/287 argued that the financial system is dominated by banks that 
have been relatively healthy but nonperforming loans remain high. Overall capital adequacy remained well 
above the statutory minimum capital requirement, at 15.1 percent at end-March 2013. The banking system as a 
whole is liquid and profitable and deposit growth has remained strong (nearly 16 percent) in recent years. 
Nevertheless, nonperforming loans are high (14.7 percent), and a few banks operating below minimum capital 
requirement. The high concentration of assets in public debt (around 37 percent of total assets) at a time of weak 
public finances is another source of risk. While NPLs are relatively well-provisioned for the system as a whole 
(over 70 percent), the slowdown in economic activity and pressures on the balance of payments continue to 
affect bank soundness. 
International Monetary Fund May 2005 IMF Country Report No. 05/157 Pakistan—Financial Sector 
Assessment Program—Technical Note—Condition of the Banking System reported  that efforts have been made 
in recent years to promote Islamic banking services. In particular, the State Bank of Pakistan (SBP) exempted 
Islamic commercial banks from the moratorium on the establishment of new banks, and the first full-fledged 
Islamic bank, Meezan Bank, was licensed in 2002. Several conventional banks have also opened branches that 
provide only Islamic financial services. The size of these Islamic banking institutions remains very small. 
Although legal ambiguities remain regarding the process of Islamization of the financial system of Pakistan, the 
establishment of new Islamic banking institutions is likely to continue in the coming years. Additionally, IMF 
Staff urged the authorities to amend the SBP Act in order to establish an independent, decision-making monetary 
policy committee, which is a pre-requisite for an optimal design and implementation of monetary policy. Staff 
stressed that full Independence would help pave the way for improved price stability, as SBP’s primary 
objective, and the elimination of future direct financing of fiscal deficits. 
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III.  METHODOLOGICAL ISSUES AND ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK  
Before introducing the methodological and analytical framework to explore the rate setting behaviors of 
Pakistani banks of different ownership structures further, it is necessary to introduce some algebraic notations or 
variables. First, let the weighted average of lending rates on new loans that banks having type i ownership, (where i 
equals to the types of ownership, i.e., i = public, private, foreign, specialized, or all banks combined in Pakistan) 
originate and the weighted average of deposit rates that these banks pay savers over a given month t , be denoted 
by tiLR , and tiDR , , respectively. These are the rates on new loans and deposits; therefore, their weighted average 
may be considered as “marginal” rates which better describe how these types of banks respond to changes in 
financial conditions, including those induced by countercyclical fiscal and monetary policy measures, as 
compared to the weighted average of the outstanding loans and the total deposits.  The difference between 
tiLR , and tiDR , is defined as the spread between the lending rate and deposit rate or the intermediation premium, 
and is denoted by tiSP, . Throughout this study, tiLR , and tiDR , are referred to as lending rate and deposit rate. 
Moreover, given a level of the lending rate, an expansionary countercyclical monetary policy measure, or any like 
change in the economy, would widen the intermediation premium. The opposite is true for a contractionary 
countercyclical monetary measure or any like change. 
Pakistani specialized banks are banks that focus on providing credits to some specific sector or specific 
segment of a specific sector in the economy. For example: (i) Zaria Taraqiati Bank Ltd. is a major specialized 
bank, focusing on rural finance and development; (ii) Industrial Development Bank of Pakistan is created with 
the primary objective of extending term finance for investment in the manufacturing sector of the economy; (iii) 
The SME Bank was established to cater to the needs of the small and medium enterprise sector. 
 
3.1 Structural Break 
 
Over time, every economy would experience many business cycles caused by internal and external 
shocks; therefore, countercyclical monetary and fiscal policy measures would be used to bring the economy back 
to its long-run path. Consequently, the intermediation premium set by banks of any ownership most likely to 
suffer some structure breaks. To search endogenously for the possibility of any structural break in the 
intermediation premia maintained by banks of the aforementioned types of ownerships, this study utilized 
Perron’s (1997) endogenous unit root test function with the intercept, slope, and the trend dummy, as specified 




SPSPTDDTtDUSP ,,1 ,1,, )(      (1) 
where, as previously defined,  i = public, private, foreign, specialized, all banks combined, i.e., is the type of 
ownership; ( )(1 bTtDU  is a post-break constant dummy variable; t is a linear time 
trend; )(1 bTtDT  is a post-break slope dummy variable; )1(1)(  bb TtTD is the break dummy 
variable; and ti,  are white-noise error terms.   The null hypothesis of a unit root is stated as 1i .  The break 
date, bT , is selected based on the minimum t-statistic for testing 1i  (see Perron, 1997, pp. 358-359). 
 
3.2 Threshold Autoregressive (TAR) model 
 
Additionally, to further investigate the behaviors of lending, deposit rates and intermediation premia of the banks 
of the aforementioned ownerships, this study uses the threshold autoregressive (TAR) model, developed by 
Enders-Siklos (2001) that allows the degree of autoregressive decay to depend on the state of the intermediation 
premium, maintained by each group of banks with the aforementioned four types of ownership as well as all 
banks combined, i.e. the “deepness” of cycles. The estimated TAR model would empirically reveal if the 
intermediation premia tend to revert back to their long-run positions faster when the premia are above or below 
their thresholds. Therefore, the TAR model indicates whether troughs or peaks persist more when shocks or 
countercyclical policy actions push the premia out of their long-run equilibrium paths.  In this model’s 
specification, the null hypothesis that each of the premium contains a unit root can be expressed 
as 02,1,  ii  , while the hypothesis that the intermediation premium is stationary with symmetric adjustments 
can be stated as 2,1, ii   . 
The first step in the Enders-Siklos’ (2001) procedure is to regress the intermediation premium or the 
spread between the lending rate and deposit rate or the intermediation premium, of the group of ibanks, tiSP,  , 
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on a constant, a linear trend and an intercept dummy (with values of zero prior to the structural break date and 
values of one for the structural break date and thereafter), as specified by equation (2).  
titiitiiiti DummytrendSP ,,2,,1,0,,       (2) 
The saved residuals, ti, from the estimation of equation (2), denoted by ti,ˆ , are then used to estimate the 





ˆˆˆ)1(ˆˆ        (3) 
where ),0.(..~ˆ 2, iti diiu  , and the lagged values of ti ,ˆ  are meant to yield uncorrelated residuals.  As 






















      (4) 
 
The threshold value, i , is  endogenously determined using the Chan (1993) procedure which obtains 
i  by minimizing the sum of squared residuals after sorting the estimated residuals in an ascending order, and 
eliminating 15 percent of the largest and smallest values.  The elimination of the largest and the smallest values 
is to assure that the  ti,ˆ series crosses through the threshold in the sample period.  Throughout this study, the 
included lags are selected by the statistical significances of their estimated coefficients as determined by the t-
statistics.  
In this model specification, ti,ˆ > i is indicative an expansionary monetary policy or a like 
economic/finance shock has lowered the deposit rate, widening the difference between the current lending rate 
and the new deposit rate and hence widening the intermediation premium. This widening of the intermediation 
premium initiates a downward adjustment in the lending rate. The reverse of articulation is true for the case 
when ti,ˆ < i . 
 
3.3 The Asymmetric Error-Correction Models 
Moreover, to investigate the short-run asymmetric dynamic behavior between the lending rate and 
deposit rate of each of the aforementioned types of ownership banks, this study specifies and estimates the 
following asymmetric threshold autoregressive vector error-correction model (TAR-VEC), equations (5) and (6).  
The estimation results of this model will reveal the nature of the Granger causality between the lending rate 
charged borrowers and deposit rate paid savers. The empirically determined nature of the Granger causality will 
help evaluate how banks of different types of ownership respond to economic and financial shocks as well as 
countercyclical policy actions that push their intermediation premia out of their long-run paths, in setting their 
lending and deposit rates. Additionally, the following TAR-VEC model differs from the conventional error-
correction models by allowing asymmetric adjustments toward the long-run equilibrium. 
tiptiiptiititiititiiiti uDRLALRLAIILR ,,1,12,,11,1,,2,1,,1,0,, )()(ˆ)1(ˆ   
 
(5)  
tiptiiptiititiititiiiti uDRALRLAIIDR ,,2,22,,21,1,,2,1,,1,0,, )(ˆ)1(
~ˆ~~     (6)  
 
where ),0.(..~ 2,,2,1 iti diiu   and the Heaviside indicator function is set in accord with (4).  denotes the change 
in, i.e., tiLR ,  is the change in the lending rate set by the banks of ownership i.p is the time period. 
Ai,kl(L)represents the first-order polynomials in the lag operator L.This model specification recognizes the fact 
that the lending rate and deposit rate respond differently depending on whether the intermediation premium is 
widening or narrowing, i.e. contractionay or expansionary monetary policy as well as economic and financial 
shocks. 
IV.  DATA AND DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS  
This study uses data on the lending rates charged borrowers and deposit rates paid by each type of the 
above specified banks, reported by the Pakistani Central Bank over the period from January 2004 to December 
20013. The sample period is constrained by the availability of the data. As previously defined, the marginal 
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lending rate and deposit rate and the intermediation premium of banks of ownership i are denoted by tiLR , , 
tiDR , , and tiSP,  , respectively. The descriptive statistics of the data set are summarized in Table 1.  
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics. 
 
 





















Mean 11.884 5.676 11.353 5.769 9.990 5.294 10.581 3.797 11.185 5.697 
Median 12.132 6.160 11.035 6.200 9.835 5.195 9.830 3.250 10.960 6.035 
Maximum 17.230 12.970 16.090 9.880 14.340 9.140 14.460 9.740 15.540 9.530 
Minimum 4.060 0.330 4.810 1.140 3.330 0.910 7.830 0.500 4.630 1.120 
Std. Dev. 2.752 2.593 2.779 2.150 2.987 1.895 1.652 1.998 2.797 2.073 
Skewness -0.836 -0.005 -0.690 -0.780 -0.573 -0.362 1.057 1.049 -0.736 -0.784 
Kurtosis 3.126 2.818 2.821 2.817 2.458 2.707 2.642 3.597 2.785 2.827 
Jarque-Bera 14.056 0.166 9.694 12.343 8.026 3.058 22.993 23.799 11.069 12.450 
Observation 120.00 120.0 120.00 120.00 120.00 120.00 120.00 120.00 120.00 120.00 
Source: Monthly Data from January 2004-December 2013, reported by the Pakistani Central Bank. 
 
Figure 1 displays the behaviors of the respective lending rate, deposit rate and their spread—the 
intermediation premia of public, private, foreign, and specialized banks—over the sample period. These 
diagrams suggest that the intermediation premia of these aforementioned types of banks, in fact, experienced 
structure breaks over the period under consideration. 
PAKISTANI LENDING, DEPOSIT RATES AND INTERMEDIATION PREMIA
January 2004 - December 2013
Source: Palkistani Central Bank and calculations by the author.
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V.  EMPIRICAL RESULTS  
5.1 Results of the Test for Structural Break 
 
The estimation results of Perron’s endogenous unit root tests are summarized in Exhibit 1.  
Procedurally, the signs and the statistical significances/insignificances of the post-break constant dummy 
variable, ( )(1 bTtDU  ; the linear time trend, t ; the post-break slope dummy variable, )(1 bTtDT  ; 
the break dummy variable, )1(1)(  bb TtTD  empirically determine whether the intermediation premium  
follows a stationary trend or non-trend process. The testing procedure also endogenously determines if the 
intermediation premium experiences a structural break over the sample period.  The test statistic for this 
determination is the calculated value of )1( t . If the Perron’s procedure suggests a structural break date but 
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the calculated value of )1( t  is not large enough to confirm the suggested break date, a Chow’s test for 
structural break will be carried out to confirm or reject the suggested break date. 
 
      Exhibit 1: Perron’s Endogenous Unit Root Test, Vietnamese Data 2004:01 to 2013:12 
a. Public Banks 
b. Private Banks 
c. Foreign Banks 
d. Specialized Banks 
e. All Banks Combined 
Notes: Critical values for t-statistics in parentheses:  Critical values based n = 100 sample for the 
break-date (Perron, 1997). “*”and “*” indicate significances at 1 percent and 5 percent levels. 
 
Based on the above procedure, the suggested break dates for the intermediation premia of Pakistani 
foreign and specialized banks are confirmed by their corresponding value of their st )'1(  . The suggested 
break dates for other three premia were confirmed by Chow’s tests for structural break. Additionally, Perron’s 
testing procedure support the hypotheses of stationarity of the intermediation premia of all banks of different 
ownerships in Pakistan.  
 
5.2 Results of Cointegration Test with Asymmetric Adjustment 
 
An important implicit assumption of the Dickey-Fuller standard unit root tests and their extension is 
that the adjustment process is symmetric. If the adjustment process is asymmetric, then, the implicitly assumed 
restrictive symmetric adjustment is indicative of model misspecification. To examine whether or not the lending 
rate and the deposit rate of the group of i banks are co-integrated when allowing for asymmetric adjustments, the 
intermediation premium is regressed on a constant, a linear trend and an intercept dummy with values of zero 
prior to the confirm structural break date and values of one for the break date and thereafter. The estimation 
results for all types of Pakistani banks are reported in Exhibit 2. The empirical results, summarized in Table 2, 
are the final estimation results after eliminating the insignificant variables based on t-statistic at 5 percent 
significant level. 
 







titibti SPTDDTtDUSP ,1,, 4615.0)(7175.30039.00011.00411.02442.3    
               (3.5374*)     (0.0307)    (-0.1198)     (0.2438)         (2.7729*)         (3.4289*) 
   No. of  augmented lags: k  9  Break Date: November 2009 4.0013)1( t  
titibti SPTDDTtDUSP ,1,, 5670.0)(6247.00460.00074.02103.41342.2    
               (5.1125*)    (4.3856*)     (2.3373**)    (-4.3965*)         (-1.3439)         (6.4598*) 
   No. of  augmented lags: k  6  Break Date: August 2008  4.9326)1( t  
titibti SPTDDTtDUSP ,1,, 3071.0)(3081.00820.003417.00491.75908.1    
               (5.3951*)     (4.4191*)     (5.7068*)      (-4.8298*)         (-0.4016)         (2.9410*) 
   No. of  augmented lags: k  1  Break Date: October 2010 *6359.6)1( t  
titibti SPTDDTtDUSP ,1,, 4610.0)(5664.70895.00500.08253.46793.5    
               (2.8948*)   (-2.5165**)     (-0.1936)     (0.3466)        (4.2179*)            (5.3338*) 
   No. of  augmented lags: k  1  Break Date: October 2004 *6.2371)1( t  
titibti SPTDDTtDUSP ,1,, 6195.0)(4177.00409.00084.07061.37355.1    
               (4.4701*)     (3.9692*)    (2.5129*)   (-4.0069*)         (-0.9861)           (6.8760*) 
   No. of  augmented lags: k  06  Break Date: October 2010 4.2224)1( t  
ttt DummySP  7492.09020.5   
                                         (30.2317*)       (2.4523**) 
       ln L = -228.9922           R2 = 0.0404   DW statistic(a) = 0.7426    F (1,118)= 6.0136** 
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s:   “*” and “**” indicate significances at 1 percent and 5 percent levels, respectively. 




The residuals from these estimations for each type of Pakistani banks are used to estimate the TAR 
model, specified by equations (3) and (4). The estimation results for the TAR model for all five different groups 
of banks are reported in Exhibit 3. Statistically, theLjung-Box statistic is used to test the serial correlation and 
the overall F-statistic is used to test the predicting power of the model. The value of the partial F-statistic tests 
the null hypothesis of symmetry, 2,1, ii   . Rejection of the null hypothesis of symmetry indicates statistically 
that adjustments around the threshold value, i  , of the intermediation premium, tiSP, , are asymmetric. The 
calculated value of   (also an F-statistic) tests the null hypothesis of no co-integration, 02,1,  ii  . 
Rejecting the null hypothesis of no-cointegration indicates that the intermediation premium is stationary. With 
regard to the stationarity of the intermediation premium, Ewing, et al. (2006, pp. 14) pointed out that this simple 
finding of stationarity is consistent with the two underlying series comprising the premium being co-integrated in 
the conventional, linear combination sense.  
 
Exhibit 3: Unit Root and Tests of Asymmetry, Pakistani Monthly Data 2004:01 to 2013:12 
a. Public Banks 
1  2  
  0: 210  H  210 :  H  
   aic sic 
-1.4599* -0.2772* 1.70803 
 = 11.6188
* F =  10.9126
* 0.4827      0.6001 
 Q Q(12)=16.9850[0.1502]      ln L =  -190.9135  F(4,113)=9.6630*  DW = 2.0473 
b. Private Banks 
1  2  
  0: 210  H  210 :  H     aic sic 
-0.2001* -0.2120** -0.8410 
 = 6.7662
* F =  4.0583
** -1.4707     -1.3259 
 Q Q(12)=13.8480 [0.3105]      ln L =  -71.2450  F(5,107)=6.8297*  DW = 2.0020 
c. Foreign Banks 
1  2  
  0: 210  H  210 :  H  
   aic sic 
tttt DummyTrendSP  6335.00128.00185.5    
                                         (25.8496*)      (3.1288*)         (-2.1019**) 
       ln L = -155.9212          R2 = 0.0660   DW statistic(a) = 0.3374    F (2,117)= 5.2023* 
tttt DummyTrendSP  0984.10373.07899.2    
                                         (12.4214*)      (8.0227*)         (-3.1756*) 
       ln L = -173.9095           R2 = 0.4392   DW statistic(a) = 0.6631    F (2,117)= 47.5968* 
tttt DummyTrendSP  0592.70618.05183.9    
                                         (14.5650*)      (9.9713*)         (-9.0925*) 
       ln L = -255.6962           R2 = 0.5055   DW statistic(a) = 1.3486    F (2,117)= 61.8133* 
tttt DummyTrendSP  6244.01726.06522.4    
                                         (25.7563*)      (4.5214*)         (-2.2266**) 
       ln L = -147.2599           R2 = 0.1730   DW statistic(a) = 0.2847    F (2,117)= 13.4422* 
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-0.3864 -0.2901* 0.9288 
 = 4.1586
** F =  0.0730 -0.4226      -0.3052 
 Q Q(12)=19.3160[0.3812]      ln L =  -137.5011  F(4,113)=5.2758*  DW = 1.9974 
d. Specialized Banks 
1  2  
  0: 210  H  210 :  H  
   aic sic 
-0.4412* -0.0634 -1.3047 
 = 4.555-
* F =  0.9311 1.3881      1.5329 
 Q Q(12)=11.4460[0.4911]      ln L =  -232.7675  F(5,107)=13.4917*  DW = 2.0353 
e. All Banks 
1  2  
  0: 210  H  210 :  H  
   aic sic 
-0.2529* -0.1915 -0.34041 
 = 4.0520
** F =  0.1009 -1.6747      -1.5573 
 Q Q(12)=13.5290[0.3318]      ln L =  -63.6263  F(4,113)=4.0977**  DW = 1.9960 
Notes: The null hypothesis of a unit root, 0: 2,1,,  iioiH  , uses the critical values from Enders and Siklos  
(2001, p. 170, Table 1 for four lagged changes and n = 500). “*” and “**”indicate 1 percent and 5 
percent levels of significance, respectively. The null hypothesis of symmetry, 2,1,, : iioiH   , uses the 
standard F distribution.  i is the threshold value determined via the Chan (1993) method. Q(12) denotes 
the Ljung-Box Q-statistic with 12 lags.  
 
The TAR-model specified by equations (2), (3) and (4) essentially describes the long-run behavior of 
the intermediation premia. Thus, with regard to the estimation results,  the statistical significance and the relative 
absolute values of the estimates of 
1,i  and 2,i  describe the long-run adjustment pattern of the 
intermediation premia around the estimated values of their estimated thresholds, si ' . More specifically, the 
statistical significances of these estimated  1,i   and 2,i  are determined by the t-statistics at the conventional 
significance levels. As to the adjustment pattern, a finding of 1,i > 2,i  indicates a faster convergence for 
positive than for negative disequilibrium. This result implies that this group of banks collectively adjusts their 
lending rate faster to the threshold value when the Pakistanis Central Bank eases money supply or any like 
shock, widening the above defined intermediation premium, than when the authority tightens  the money supply 
or any similar shock, narrowing the premium. The reverse is true for contractionary monetary policy measures or 
economics/finance shocks where the deposit rate increases and the intermediation premium narrows.  
Symmetrically, a finding of of 1,i < 2,i  indicates a lower convergence for positive than for negative 
disequilibrium and hence the opposite of the aforementioned articulated attendant consequences would be true. 
 
5.3 Results of the Asymmetric Threshold Autoregressive Error-Correction Models 
 
The TAR-VEC model specified by equations (4), (5) and (6) captures the short-run dynamic 
behaviors of the lending rate and deposit rate, allowing for the long-run asymmetric adjustment of the 
intermediation premium, for each of the groups of Pakistani banks with different ownership structures. Exhibit 4 
summarizes the estimation results for.  In the summary of the estimation results, the overall fitness of the model 
is evaluated by the following conventional diagnosis instruments. Q(12) is the Ljung-Box statistics and its 
significance is in square brackets, testing for the first twelve of the residual autocorrelations to be jointly equal to 
zero. ln L is the log likelihood. The overall F(n,m)-statistic testing for the overall fitness of the model, with “*” 
indicating the significant level of 1 percent. The two subscripts n and m indicate numerator and the denominator 
of the degree of freedom of the overall F(n,m)-statistic. 
As to equation specific, in summarizing of the estimation results, Aij(L)represents the first-order 
polynomials in the lag operator L. The Fijrepresents the calculated F-statistics with the p-value in square 
brackets, testing the null hypothesis that all coefficients of Aijare equal to zero. The t-statistics are reported with 
“*”, “**” and “***” indicating the 1, 5 and 10 percent significant levels, respectively The retained estimated 
coefficients of the polynomial Aij(L)are  based on the 5 percent level of significance of the calculated t-statistics. 
The significance of the partial statistic F12 indicates a unidirectional Granger causality from deposit rate to 
lending rate of the group of i banks while the significance of the partial statistic F21 implies a unidirectional 
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Granger causality from their deposit lending rate to deposit rate. Obviously, the significances of both of these 
two partial F-statistics signal the bidirectional Granger causality between the lending and deposit rates of this 
group of banks. 
Moreover, as to the long-run adjustment, the estimation results of the TAR-VEC model, the statistical 
significance (determined by the t-statistic at conventional significance level) of  1,i   indicates that the lending 
rate of the group of i banks respond to the positive changes in the intermediation premium while the significance 
of 2,i  reveals that these banks respond to negative changes in the intermediation premium spread in the long 
run.  Statistical significances of both 1,i   and 2,i  show that lending rate of the group of i banks responds to 
both positive and negative changes in their intermediation premium. Similar interpretations can be applied to the 
statistical significances of both 1,
~
i  and 2,
~
i , individually as well as collectively.  
 
Exhibit 4: Estimation Results for M-TAR VEC Model, Pakistani Monthly Data 2004:01 to 2013:12    
a. Public Banks: 
tititttttt uDRLALRLAIILR 1121111 )()(ˆ)1(2096.0ˆ1823.00199.0     
(0.2722)    (-2.6536*)          (-3.7346*)           F11=7.1372[0.0001]   F12=10.1662[0.000] 
  
 Q(12) = 5.3850[0.9439]           ln L = -80.4367        Overall F(13,81)-statistic =8.8276* 
 
tititttttt uDRLALRLAIIDR 2222111 )()(ˆ)1(2016.0ˆ3500.00440.0     
 (0.3246)    (3.0761*)     (2.0041**)          F21=5.1138[0.0002]   F22=8.3797[0.0000] 
 
 Q(12) =2.7220[0.9972]                          ln L = -141.1707    Overall F(11,84)-statistic =5.7336* 
 
b. Private Banks: 
tititttttt uDRLALRLAIILR 1121111 )()(ˆ)1(0849.0ˆ1089.00274.0     
(0.6213)    (-1.8693***)              (-0.9600)    F11=8.3369[0.0004]   F12=2.1560[0.1451] 
 
 Q(12) = 7.6140[0.8145]           ln L = -47.8506      Overall F(6,103)-statistic =3.6272* 
 
tititttttt uDRLALRLAIIDR 2222111 )()(ˆ)1(0289.0ˆ0651.00167.0     
 (-0.2876)     (0.8853)             (-0.2668)          F21=4.8568[0.0001]   F22=4.9176[0.0013] 
 
 Q(12) =7.4420[0.8271]                        ln L = -47.4057       Overall  F(13,83)-statistic =3.8337* 
 
c. Foreign Banks: 
tititttttt uDRLALRLAIILR 1121111 )()(ˆ)1(2318.0ˆ1400.00124.0     
(-0.1771)    (-1.6238)           (-2.7760*)        F11=5.0975[0.0026]   F12=3.3746[0.0695] 
 
 Q(12) = 10.9620[0.5322]           ln L = -83.3738       Overall F(6,91)-statistic =4.9263* 
 
tititttttt uDRLALRLAIIDR 2222111 )()(ˆ)1(0527.0ˆ1811.01144.0     
 (0.0871)    (2.2818**)         (1.9660***)       F21=7.3950[0.0000]   F22=7.9863[0.0000] 
 
 Q(12) =5.8130[0.9252]                        ln L = -64.5372        Overall  F(13,82)-statistic =6.9165* 
 
d. Specialized Banks: 
tititttttt uDRLALRLAIILR 1121111 )()(ˆ)1(0309.0ˆ0908.01112.0     
(1.5585)    (-1.6482)     (0.6556)         F11=6.7478[0.0000]   F12=6.0645[0.0035] 
 
 Q(12) = 11.3470[0.4995]           ln L = -61.6145        Overall  F(10,84)-statistic =5.2307* 
 
tititttttt uDRLALRLAIIDR 2222111 )()(ˆ)1(4550.0ˆ2139.01200.0     
 (0.6152)    (1.1522)       (3.1093*)          F21=5.4010[0.0019]   F22=3.3913[0.0125] 
 
 Q(12) =5.3250[0.9462]                       ln L = -163.6874        Overall F(9,88)-statistic =10.2825* 
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e. All Banks: 
tititttttt uDRLALRLAIILR 1121111 )()(ˆ)1(0933.0ˆ0515.00028.0     
(0.0513)    (-0.6645)    (-1.0941)           F11=6.7991[0.0004]   F12=2.4756[0.0666] 
 
 Q(12) = 6.6860[0.8776]           ln L = -28.7377       Overall  F(8,89)-statistic =3.3758* 
 
tititttttt uDRLALRLAIIDR 2222111 )()(ˆ)1(1515.0ˆ1706.00842.0     
 (-1.2273)    (1.8177***)         (-1.4476)        F21=5.1347[0.0004]   F22=3.9648[0.0107] 
 
 Q(12) =8.7880[0.7209]                      ln L = -42.2685         Overall  F(10,86)-statistic =4.0206* 
 
 
       Notes:Partial F-statistics for lagged values of changes in the lending rate and Central Bank discount rate, 
respectively, are reported under the specified null hypotheses. Q(12) is the Ljung-Box Q-statistic to 
test for serial correlation up to 12 lags. “*”, “**” and “***” indicate 1 percent, 5 percent and 10 
percent levels of significance of the t-statistics, respectively. 
VI.  DISCUSSION AND A POSSIBLE ALTERNATIVE INTERPRETATION OF THE ESTIMATION 
RESULTS  
6.1 Discussions of the Estimation Results 
 
First of all, graphs in Figure 1 suggest that the intermediation premium of Pakistani public, private, 
foreign, and specialized banks experience structure breaks at different dates from January 2004 to December 
2013. The suggested break dates for the intermediation premium of Pakistani foreign and specialized banks are 
confirmed by their corresponding calculated value of their st )'1(  , while the suggested break dates for other 
three premium were confirmed by Chow’s tests for structural break. This finding tethered with the descriptive 
statistics summarized in Table 1 and given that all of Pakistani banks face the same economic and financial 
landscapes in Pakistan and around the word over the sample period suggest that these groups of banks perceive 
risks differently and have different rate setting behaviors. 
As to the long-run adjustment of the intermediation premia of Pakistani banks of different ownerships, 
the estimated coefficients of equations (2), (3), and (4) reveal the following results. The An analysis of the 
overall estimation results indicates that the estimation results for all five groups of Pakistani banks are devoid of 
serial correlation and have good predicting power as evidenced by the Ljung-Box statistics and the overall F-
statistics, respectively. The value of the partial  -statistics indicate that the null hypothesis of symmetry, 
0: 2,1,0,  iiiH  , should be rejected at conventional levels for all five groups of banks, confirming that their 
intermediation premia are all stationary.   
Additionally, the calculated partial F-statistics testing the null hypothesis of no-
cointegration, 2,1,0, : iiiH   , can be rejected for the public banks and the private banks while this hypothesis 
for foreign banks, specialized banks, and all banks cannot be rejected at conventional levels. These empirical 
findings indicate that the adjustment of the intermediation premia, tiSP, , around their endogenously determined 
thresholds, i , of the public banks and the private banks in Pakistan are asymmetric; while the adjustments of the 
premia of other three groups of banks are symmetric. Moreover, for a group of i   banks, if the adjustment of 
their intermediation premium around its estimate threshold is asymmetric and if their 1,i  is less than 
their 2,i , then, these banks are said to exhibit a predatory rate setting behavior. Based on the previous 
articulation, an analysis of the empirical results for public and private banks, the two groups whose 
intermediation premia adjust around their endogenously determined thresholds are asymmetric, reveals that only 
Pakistani private banks collectively exhibit a predatory rate setting behavior.  
With regard to the behaviors of the lending rates and deposit rates of the five groups of banks under 
investigation, analyses of the overall estimation results indicate that the estimated equations (5) and (6) for each 
of the groups of banks are absent of serial correlation and have good predicting power as evidenced by the by the 
Ljung-Box statistics and the overall F-statistics, respectively. As to the long-run adjustment of the lending rates 
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of these groups of banks, based on the statistical significances of both 1,i   and 2,i , the estimation results of 
equation (5) of the TAR-VEC model suggest that: (i)  the lending rate of the group of public banks respond not 
only to the narrowing but also to the widening of the intermediation premium; (ii) the lending rate of the group 
of private banks respond only to the widening but not the narrowing of their intermediation premium; (iii) the 
lending rate of the group of foreign banks respond only to the narrowing but not the widening of their 
intermediation premium; but (iv) the lending rates of the group of specialized banks and all banks combined do 
not  respond  to either the narrowing nor the widening of the intermediation premium. 
 As to the long-run adjustment of the deposit rates of these groups of banks, based on the statistical 
significances of both 1,
~
i  and 2,
~
i , the estimation results of equation (6) of the TAR-VEC model indicate that: 
(i) the deposit rate of the groups of public banks and foreign banks responds not only to the narrowing but also to 
the widening of the intermediation premium; (ii) the deposit rate of the group of specialized banks responds only 
to the narrowing but not the widening of their intermediation premium; (iii) ) the deposit rate of the group of all 
Pakistani banks combined responds only to the widening but not the narrowing of their intermediation premium; 
but (iv) the deposit  rate of the group of private banks does not  respond  to either the narrowing nor the widening 
of the intermediation premium.  
In addition to estimating the long-run equilibrium relationship and asymmetric adjustment, the 
estimated TAR-VEC model also allows for determinations of the Granger causality between the lending rates 
and deposit rates of all five groups of Pakistani banks in question.  The nature of the Granger causality—
bidirectional, unidirectional or mutually exogenous—reveals how these rates react to their own lagged changes 
and lagged changes of the other’s.  The partial F-statistics, F12 and F21, in the estimated equations (5) and (6) 
reveal that:  (i) the lending and deposit rates of the Pakistani public banks and specialized banks respond not only 
to their own lagged changes but also to lagged changes of their other rates; (ii) the lending rates of the private 
banks, foreign banks and all banks combined in Pakistan respond only to their own lagged while their deposit 
rate respond not only to their own lagged changes but also to lagged changes of their lending rate. 
 
6.2 A Plausible Interpretation 
 
The peculiarity of this study is the estimation results using data from Pakistani public banks revealing 
unusually high absolute values of, respectively, 1.4599 and 0.2772 for the estimated coefficients 1 and 2 of 
equations (3) and (4) and they are  highly statistically significant, as evidenced by the reported t-statistics. 
Economically, these empirical findings indicate that if changes in the economy cause the deposit rate to fall 
resulting in a decrease in the intermediation premium of the public banks from 4.00 percent to 3.00 percent (4.00 
- 3.00 = 1.00), for example, the monthly upward adjustment of the premium is 0.2772x 1.00 = 0.2772 percent, 
i.e., it would take 1.00/.02772 = 3.61 months for the intermediation premium to reach its long-run threshold. 
However, if the changes in the economy cause the intermediation premium of the public banks to increase by 1 
percent, within only one month, the  downward adjustment would be 1.4599x1.00 = 1.4599 percent which is 
0.4599 percent overshot! 
Possibly, the above  findings of this study from the  group  of  publ ic  banks  suggest underlying 
problems in a country with the Heritage Foundation index of economic freedom and corruption 
perceptionsindexof55/100and2.8/10respectively. Based on the corruption perception index, the Heritage 
Foundation ranked Pakistantobethe126
th 
out of183most corrupt countries in 2012.Additionally, in developing 
countries, public sector and publically owned institutions are the cradles of corruption and also disrupted by 
terrorist activities. As to economic freedom, Pakistan was ranked 127
th
out of 179, with 1
st
being the most free 
country by Heritage Foundationin2012. 
However, at first glance, he above e mp i r i c a l  results seem to support the consumer reaction 
hypothesis as articulated by Stiglitzand Weiss(1981). It is important to note that the consumer reaction 
hypothesis is predicated on a high interest rate environment in the context of an advanced market economy, 
which is critical to understanding the rationale for bank behavior in such an environment. The interest rate is the 
price of using financial capital or funds, and microeconomic theory demonstrates that in the relatively high price 
range, the demand for the underlying product is more elastic. Therefore, in the relatively high lending rate 
environment such as the case of Vietnam, the demand for loans is likely to be relatively more elastic. 
Customarily, originating loans would generate some non-interest incomes, such as servicing fees, 
origination fees, and interest incomes for lending institutions. However, in a corrupt environment there may be 
some “other benefits” for both the originating institutions and possibly their management as well. Naturally, it is 
easier to ask for and the borrowers are more likely to agree to providing “other benefits” or “graft” in the 
declining lending rate environment than when the rate is rising. Certainly, a decline in the deposit rate widens the 
intermediation premium, which allows lending institutions to originate loans at a lower lending rate and still 
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maintain the old spread. This coupled with the high elasticity of demand precipitates a significant increase in 
demand for loans which in turn will create opportunities for lending institutions and their management to 
generate lucrative “other benefits” and hence the observed quicker responses, overshot in the case of Pakistani 
public banks. 
Asymmetrically, in the rising rate environment, the new loans must be generated at higher lending rates 
and the possible negative attendant impacts on “graft” do not provide attractive opportunities for lending in 
situations and their management, and hence the observed slower responses. As a fore mentioned, the corrupt 
environment, and when counter cyclical monetary policy or economic change causes decreases in the premium, 
managers of lending institutions must weigh the marginal non-interest benefits to both the originating institutions 
and themselves against marginal loss in interest income in originating new loans at the new lending rate to 
restore the spread to the threshold. This benefit and graft maximizing process in the face of high elasticity of 
demand for loans precipitated by  a  high rate environment would be a very plausible explanation of the 
empirical finding soft r\the above pattern of the asymmetric adjustment process in the Pakistani public banks. 
The above discussion on the  asymmetric adjustment of the intermediation premium of Pakistani public 
banks may help explain the bidirectional Granger-causality findings in the estimation of the TAR model. More 
specifically, when a shock widens the intermediation premium, management o f  m a n a g e m e n t  of public 
banks w i l l  t r y  t o  i n c r e a s e  t h e  l o a n  originations  to  maximize  non-interest  income  and  
“other  benefits”  while maintaining the old spread. Facing high elastic demand for loans, precipitated by a high 
rate environment, the management may achieve this objective by alowering the lending rate quickly to attract 
new loans. This phenomenon is consistent with the empirical finding so fasymmetric adjustments of the lending 
rate and the intermediation premium as well as the bidirectional Granger causality. 
VII.  CONCLUDING REMARKS  
This study applies Enders and Siklos’ (2001) procedure to test for the long-run asymmetric co-
integrating relationship and short-run dynamic Granger causality between Pakistani lending and depose rates set 
by public, private, foreign, specialized, and all banks combined over the period January 2004 to December 2013. 
The empirical results suggest a long-run asymmetric co-integration relationship between the rates.  The Granger 
causality tests suggest bidirectional and asymmetric causality between lending and deposit rates set by Pakistani 
public, private banks, while the lending rate set be the country’s foreign, specialized and all banks combined are 
exogenous from their deposit rates. The asymmetric and different nature of the Ganger causalities exhibit by 
banks with different ownership structures should be of special interest for the Central Bank in formulating and 
implementing its countercyclical monetary policy and for corporations in determining their capital structures. 
Terrorism is imposing additional costs on Pakistan’s asymmetric information system.  
Perron’s (1997) endogenous unit root test, supplemented by the Chow test for structural break, reveals 
that even though Pakistani banks of different ownership structures face the same domestic and international 
economic landscapes, their intermediation premium experience different structural break dates over the sample 
period. This finding suggests that banks of different ownership structures have different rate setting behaviors.  
More specifically, the empirical results indicate that private banks collectively exhibit a predatory rate setting 
behavior while the rate setting behaviors of Pakistani banks with other ownership structures and all banks 
combined are consistent with the consumer reaction hypothesis as articulated by Stiglitz and Weiss (1981). 
 The rate setting behaviors of foreign banks, specialized banks and notably the unusually fast and 
overshot adjustments of the lending rates in response to increases in the intermediation premium of public banks 
in the face Pakistani corrupt opaque operating environment are interpreted as graft maximization.  The graft 
maximizing phenomenon seems to be acute at the public banks which should not be a surprise since public 
sector and publically owned institutions are the cradles of corruption in developing countries.  
Most studies of rate setting behaviors are of macro-nature, i.e., using data from all banks combined. 
This study contributes to the literature by using data from banks with different ownership structures and by 
finding differences in their rate setting behaviors. More interestingly, rate setting behaviors of banks of some 
ownership structures, the public banks and private banks in this study, may be markedly different from that of all 
banks combined.  As compared to the results for all banks combined in this investigation, these differences are 
glossed over. Therefore, empirical results of this investigation would help policy makers to design and 
implement proper policy and investors to design their investment strategies. 
The limitation of this investigation is that, due to the data limitation, the classification of banks in 
different ownership structures is not mutually exclusive. For example, the Industrial Development Bank of 
Pakistan is classified as a public as well as a specialized bank. Our conjecture is that if the classification were 
mutually exclusive, the different rate setting behaviors of banks with different ownership structure would be 
more distinctive. 
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